Mythbusting Real Time Crime Centers
- AJRC Community
- Feb 5
- 5 min read
Recently, Fayetteville and other cities in Arkansas have been exploring the possibility of implementing real-time crime centers (RTCC). A RTCC is a hub for law enforcement to analyze and share live data from surveillance databases to allegedly reduce crime in our community. However, Axon Fuses, a major corporation that specializes in the software and installment of these cameras, has acknowledged there are not any scientifically validated studies showing that RTCCs prevent crime. Instead, the data only shows their use after incidents occur. While proponents argue that an RTCC could improve public safety, evidence from other jurisdictions raises serious concerns.
Cameras and AI tracking tools implemented by these centers are invasive to all, including law-abiding citizens. Flock’s system aggregates data from private cameras and law enforcement customers into a centralized cloud database that can be searched by hundreds of police agencies, creating a nationwide surveillance infrastructure. The FBI’s national database (NCIC) that Flock checks plates against is known to be inaccurate, increasing error risks. Flock is actively developing machine-vision analytics and audio detection features like “Raven,” which would turn cameras into tools that can flag behaviors, not just plates. Empirically, after a surveillance system is installed, its use tends to expand beyond initial purposes, and AI detection exemplifies this trend.
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and its counterpart in Arkansas guarantee all persons a right to privacy, shielding ‘the people’ from ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ without a warrant based on probable cause. The warrant must also be explicit in what may be searched and/or seized (4th Amendment; Article 2, Section 15, Ark. Con.). Supreme Court case law is not kind to modern, technological, warrantless surveillance. Carpenter rejected public existence as a form of privacy forfeiture; Riley held that warrantless cell phone searches are unconstitutional; Jones held that GPS trackers over extended periods of time constitute a search (Jones, 203). An RTCC that relies on surveillance conducted without probable cause or a warrant would violate the federal Fourth Amendment and Arkansas Article Two rights of Fayetteville residents.
Jurisdictions that utilize these centers neglect to treat the causes of crime and once again resort to the kind of lazy law enforcement that disproportionately locks away poor people and minorities. The statement the government makes is as follows: we have no interest in alleviating crime in a humane and ethical fashion. These cameras and systems can track anyone, anywhere.
In Texas, a woman who received an abortion out of state was tracked using a network of 80,000 cameras and automatic license plate readers (ALPRs). Police were able to access cameras nationwide, including in states where abortion is legal, such as Washington and Illinois. While in that specific incident, they were not looking to charge her with murder, the use was nonetheless–even if inadvertently–a flex of the state’s power to know what everyone is doing, where, when, and how.
A U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology study found higher false positives in one-to-one facial recognition matching for Black, Native American, and Asian individuals. These groups are disproportionately harmed by data collection practices and privacy abuses from both the government and private sector. This disparity increases the risk of false accusations, wrongful arrests, and character assassination.
This technology is also ripe for abuse and corruption. Incumbents can spy on their opponents and the police have yet another, more invasive means of surveilling the public. Daniel Schwarz, a privacy and technology strategist with the New York Civil Liberties Union, believes the readers could be used to surveil protestors and undocumented individuals. Out-of-state police can search cameras in Illinois cities for use in immigration enforcement, allowing them to conduct related searches.
Instead of providing us with safety, constant surveillance deprives us of our constitutional right to privacy and gives the government a fourth amendment loophole to run with. That loophole is most advantageous when investigators are able to access cameras on private and commercial property–as those images and videos are not subject to public records requests and do not require a warrant.
Arkansas residents should consider these potential harms carefully and advocate against establishing a system that prioritizes surveillance over addressing the root causes of harm in our communities.
ACLU Findings: Fast-Growing Company Flock is Building a
Flock’s system aggregates data from private cameras and law enforcement customers into a centralized cloud database that can be searched by hundreds of police agencies, creating a nationwide surveillance infrastructure.
The GBI’s national database (NCIC) that Flock checks plates against is itself known to be inaccurate, increasing error risks.
Flock is actively developing machine-vision analytics and audio detection features like “Raven,” which would turn cameras into tools that can flag behaviors, not just plates.
Empirically, after a surveillance system is installed, its use tends to
The case for the Fourth Amendment https://jlsp.law.columbia.edu/files/2025/05/Hill.pdf
The fourth amendment frames the scaffolding of the U.S.’s right to privacy, shielding “the people” from “unreasonable searches and seizures” without a warrant resulting from probable cause. The warrant must also be explicit in what may be searched and/or seized (4th Amendment; Article 2, Section 15, Ark. Con.).
Supreme Court case law is not kind to modern, technological, warrantless surveillance creep. Carpenter rejected public existence as a form of privacy forfeiture; Riley held that warrantless cell phone searches are unconstitutional; Jones pinned the fact that GPS trackers over extended periods of time constitute a search (Jones, 203).
An RTCC reliant on surveillance completed prior to the existence of probable cause and a warrant would violate the people of Fayetteville’s federal fourth amendment & state article two rights.
Evanston, Illinois terminates contract with Flock Safety.
Flock (RTCC company) failed to establish distinct permissions and protocols to ensure local compliance while running a pilot program with federal users.
Out-of-state police had searched cameras in Illinois cities for use in immigration enforcement. Several non-Illinois agencies that Evanston shared data with had made immigration-related searches.
Flock allowed U.S. Customs and Border protection to access Illinois license plate cameras on Illinois roads and surveil drivers.
Austin Organizers Cancel City’s Flock ALPR Contract
AI surveillance systems are prone to misuse and mistakes.
potential of using the data against immigrants and people seeking reproductive healthcare.
Texas authorities were implicated in a 404 media report on the use of these cameras to target those seeking abortion.
A nationwide search for a woman included 83,000 ALPR cameras and scanning within states where abortion is legal (e.g. Washington & Illinois).
In wider implications, these cameras can be used to build models of a person’s daily life and there is no requirement for a warrant to track the data.
An audit of the Austin Police Department program reveals that over 20% of ALPR database searches lacked proper documentation. The audit also revealed contract language allowed for data retention beyond council-mandated limits on retention and potential sharing with outside members.
30 community groups joined together to successfully prevent contract renewal.
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